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Abstract
Gramsci’s Philosophy of Praxis was an attempt to present Marxism as a political 
philosophy promoting the inter-definable relation between theory and practice. 
No practice without theory; every man was a philosopher. Marx’s call to change 
the world (act) more than interpret it (think) did not repudiate philosophy. It re-
affirmed the unity theory-practice contextualising it in history. This characterised 
the intellectual project of the Prison Notebooks as the way ahead for the political 
affirmation of the working class. Praxis became a pedagogical, consciousness-
raising practice. Enriched by other concepts – structure-superstructure (mode of 
production), intellectuals-working class (historic bloc) – Gramsci’s praxis was also 
an attempt to prevent Marxism, philosophically presented as historical materialism, 
from morphing into metaphysics and vulgar materialism. Respecting the strictures 
of ‘translatability’, praxis is adopted to discuss the 1970s industrialisation and its 
aftermath in Malta.
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Introduction
Antonio Gramsci was born in 1891 in Ales (Sardinia). Following his education on the 
island, he gained a scholarship and began to study modern linguistics at the University 
of Turin. However, political and economic developments in Italy and outside, turned 
his attention away from academic exercise to political activity and journalism. He 
was elected to parliament in 1924 as a member of the Italian Communist Party 
he helped co-found. When the Fascist government relinquished basic freedoms, 
Gramsci was arrested on November 8, 1926, still an MP, and sentenced to a 20-year 
prison term. He began his Prison Notebooks (henceforth PNs) in February 1929 and 
stopped in April 1935, physically and mentally exhausted.  Extremely weak, in April 
1937 he was released and died a few days later in a health clinic.
In the PNs, Gramsci studied the relation between theory and practice within the 
Marxist tradition. This included how the study of philosophy contributed to political 
and economic practice. The goal was to cleanse Marxism, philosophically framed 
as historical materialism, from mechanistic and deterministic trends; the tradition 
was transformed into a philosophy of praxis (henceforth PoP). Gramsci followed this 
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path heralded by Marx’s call in his Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right for the 
realisation of philosophy by a combative progressive movement that transcended 
prior German philosophy, considered strong in theory but weak in achieving the 
emancipation of the masses.
The head of this emancipation is philosophy, its heart the proletariat. 
Philosophy cannot realize itself without the transcendence of the 
proletariat, and the proletariat cannot transcend itself without the 
realization of philosophy.1
Re-affirming its unity with practice, “theory also becomes a material force as 
soon as it has gripped the masses.” (ibid.)
This re-iterated the call in the Theses on Feuerbach (1845; henceforth Theses) to 
change the world rather than merely interpret it. These two facets of the PoP can 
be derived from this. 
Italy
In Italy, the PoP was developed as an autonomous philosophical system by the 
Italian Marxist, Antonio Labriola. The “marrow of historical materialism”, he wrote, 
it moved “from life to thought, and not from thought to life; this is the realistic 
process” (in Haug, 2000, p.6). Besides its Theses-based call to arms, the autonomous 
status inspired Gramsci to take the intellectual challenge to high culture (Burgio, 
2014, 414-447). In retaliation to Croce’s downgrading of Marxism to a canon of 
research, Gramsci rectified: 
… at the level of theory PoP cannot be confounded with or reduced 
to any other philosophy. Its originality lies not only in its transcending 
of previous philosophies but also and above all in that it opens up a 
completely new road, renewing from head to toe the whole way of 
conceiving philosophy itself. (Q11:27)2
Both Croce, Labriola’s moral philosophy student at the University of Rome, 
and the other Italian philosopher, Gentile, wrote texts on Marxism but both took 
praxis to the political Right. Croce was to have an impact on Gramsci (Hegel and 
Machiavelli). His secularism and anti-positivism, a moral and intellectual stance 
more progressive than other alternatives, and relations with the French syndicalist 
Georges Sorel, made him popular with the Left. Gramsci’s youthful Croceanism was 
revised in the PNs. 
1 Available from https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.
htm. [Accessed on August 31, 2019]. 
2 Q stands for Quaderno (Notebook), followed by the note number. This accords with 
Gerratana (Gramsci, 1975). 
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Gramsci thought the outspoken anti-communist Croce was correct in his attack 
on materialist Marxists and the need to liberate Marxist thought from positivist 
dogma. Notwithstanding authorship, all intellectual material had to be subjected to 
the same critical rigour. Croce’s role also drew attention to culture and philosophy 
in politics, and the role of the great intellectuals in creating (or not) a historic bloc 
of intellectuals and working class (Q10/I:12). For Gramsci, he was a prop for passive 
revolution with its “dialectic of conservation and innovation” (Q8:27). In line with 
this concept re-elaborated from Vincenzo Cuoco’s reference to the 1799 Neapolitan 
top-down democratic experiment lacking popular support, Croce’s histories express 
a liberal fear of the masses. In Theory and history of historiography, Croce countered 
Marxism’s totalitarian ideology with his ‘religion of freedom’ but, as Gramsci counter-
attacked, his ethico-political history was a “taming of Hegelian dialectics” and “part 
of a liberal utopia that aims to banish from history the destructive moment and 
transform contradictions into differences” (Haug, 2000, pp.3-4). Gramsci considered 
this elite intellectual practice as philosophic obfuscation. 
He believes he writes a history in which the element of class is 
exorcised and instead he describes with great accuracy and merit the 
political masterpiece by means of which a determinate class manages 
to present and to have accepted the conditions of its existence and 
its class development as a universal principle, as a conception of the 
world, as a religion, that is, he describes in reality the development of 
a practical means of government and domination. (Q10/I:10) 
 
Conceptions of the world and consciousness 
In 1929, on the first page of Q1, Gramsci set forth the need to study the “theory of 
history and historiography”. This resurfaced in a letter of the same year to Tania, his 
sister-in-law. Concurrently, he translated Marx’s Theses and the historico-political 
‘Preface’ to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859; henceforth 
Preface), both fundamental texts for the PoP. Discussing it in terms of historical 
materialism, Gramsci placed the accent on ‘historical’ instead of ‘materialism’, 
the latter more prone to metaphysical temptation. This spurred him to criticise 
Bukharin’s Marxism as “metaphysical or mechanical (vulgar) materialism” (Q11:22) 
in terms of causal laws explaining both natural and social world; determinism 
and rejection of free will. This was regress to pre-Marxian metaphysics searching 
for the eternal (Q4, p.40). Instead, to understand the ‘nature of man’, one starts 
from social relations in historically determined social formations rather than via 
‘pure’ metaphysics. As “absolute historicism”, he wrote, the PoP was “the absolute 
secularisation and earthliness of thought, an absolute humanism of history” 
(Q11:27). Althusser (2006) was to remain unconvinced: the role of philosophy was 
ahistorical. Countering metaphysics was one thing; drowning theory in historicism, 
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another. For Althusser, Marxist dialectical philosophy (not historical materialism) 
corrects knowledge and defends theory from ideology and is not a conception of 
the world. However, this suggested theory as science’s gatekeeper, alienated from 
class struggle. This dialectical materialism was rather undialectical when what was 
needed instead was for it not to be a “a philosophy of Marxism, but a philosophy for 
Marxism” (Thomas, 2009, p. 34).
For Gramsci, class conflict had to do with consciousness building and philosophy 
was a tool in class ideological relations. However, besides external challenge, this 
faced problems within Marxist theory. In his Preface, Marx describes social relations 
being independent of the will of the agents while social consciousness corresponded 
to the economic structure.
The mode of production of material life conditions the general process 
of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of 
men that determines their existence, but their social existence that 
determines their consciousness.3
Gramsci was to conceptually re-integrate will and redefine Marx’s 
superstructure(s) as the consciousness-forming political and ideological context 
outside the exclusive determination of the economic structure. Superstructures are 
not “mere appearances” or “less real”, as suggested by Croce (Malinowski, 2005, pp. 
971-2). ‘Appearance’ is attributable to superstructural mutability and not to historical 
validity: “‘Man acquires consciousness of social relations in the ideological terrain’: 
is not this an affirmation of the necessity and the validity of ‘appearances’?” (Q8:60). 
The terrain is where, in Gramsci’s terms, “every man is a philosopher”, developing 
a concept of the world, not necessarily elaborate or specialised, but reflected in his 
action, common sense, and language. This is where civil society becomes a central 
concept, similarly re-elaborated by Gramsci. Thankful for its bourgeois creation, the 
subaltern masses had an opportunity for ethico-political emancipation subverting 
traditional dominant-subaltern relations (Finocchiaro, 2002). To protect it from 
metaphysics, following Lenin, Gramsci developed the hegemonic apparatus. Buci-
Glucksmann described how this “qualifies the concept of hegemony and gives it 
greater precision … as a complex set of institutions, ideologies, practices and agents 
(including the ‘intellectuals’)” (1980, p. 48). Far from speculative and generic political 
theory, the PoP has to tackle concrete and established hegemonic apparatuses 
expressing the materiality of class ̶  the Church, schools, trade unions, etc.–and 
dismantle their social basis. It also confirms the extended state concept combining 
formal, political institutions with civil society’s hegemonic forces. Faced with 
crowded ‘trenches’ and ‘permanent fortifications’ in civil society, politics becomes 
a war of position. In it, the PoP does not exclude the ethico-political and instead 
attaches “‘full weight’ to the cultural factor, to cultural activity, to the necessity for a 
3  Available from https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-econo-
my/preface.htm. [Accessed on August 31, 2019].
Joseph Gravina
153
cultural front alongside the merely economic and merely political ones” (Q10/I:12). 
This pulls philosophy toward politics.
Praxis, a pedagogical concern 
As a politician and journalist, Gramsci was in a constant relation with the social milieu 
projecting a specific role for the intellectual. There are individual intellectuals with 
their “more or less subjective and arbitrary ideologies” and the ‘elite’ Renaissance 
intellectuals who educate people ‘from above’, shying away from political action; 
others are “organic” or “collective” (the Party), ensuring the “‘hegemony’ of a ruling 
class by carrying its ‘conception of the world’ (or organic ideology) into the everyday 
life of all men” (Thomas, 2009, p. xxiv). Gramsci historicizes this in the transition 
from castal logic to capitalist modernity’s fluid inter-class mobility. Caste survives 
amongst the clergy, high officers in the army and bureaucracy and traditional 
intellectuals in academies and university, etc. Caste is also recalled when profitable 
to the dominant class (Burgio, 2014, pp. 176-7). Still, the bourgeoisie recognised “the 
will of conformism” and hence, ethicity in the conception of the law and function 
of the State as it attempted to absorb and assimilate other classes. For Gramsci, 
this extended state beyond the formal was an educator not exclusively limited to 
private economic interests. This is associated with “Hegel’s doctrine of parties and 
associations as the ‘private’ woof of the State”, a French Revolution legacy, and 
described as, 
… government with the consent of the governed ̶ but with organised 
consent, and not generic and vague as it is expressed in the instant of 
elections. The State has and demands consent, but it also ‘educates’ 
this consent, by means of the political and syndical associations; 
these, however, are private organisms, left to the private initiative of 
the ruling class. (Q1:47)
Nonetheless, the dominant class still has the initiative in civil society creating a 
social basis for its hegemonic leadership. Suggestions of passive revolution follow 
when the state’s ethical or emancipatory claims are shown to be empty words, and 
political debate is bureaucratised and technicised. Once again, philosophy has a role. 
The philosophy of an epoch… is, therefore, nothing other than the 
‘history’ of that epoch itself, nothing other than the mass of variations 
that the leading group has succeeded in imposing on preceding reality. 
History and philosophy are in this sense indivisible. They form a ‘bloc’. 
(Q10/II:17). 
The PoP becomes the alter ego even when considering transitions to socialism 
that were complicated in the West: 
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It is the expression of these subaltern classes who want to educate 
themselves in the art of government and who have an interest in 
knowing all truths, even the unpleasant ones, and in avoiding the 
(impossible) deceptions of the upper class and ̶ even more  ̶ their own. 
(Q10/II:4) 
Malta
Taking philosophy, politics and history integral to Gramsci’s PoP in order to elicit 
meaningful links between two separate realities, and furthermore, across time, is 
open to a number of traps, first and foremost that of pushing theory beyond its 
context. Significantly, this association is a bedrock criterion of PoP. Liguori consoles: 
“Something is always lost in translation” (2015, p.210). It suggests caution. Another 
suggestion is to advance from history. The first step is to set the Maltese context in 
the 1970s. Beforehand, one final reflection. The arguments here deal with political 
and ideological, historically-determined social relations. 
The Malta Labour Party (henceforth MLP) won the 1971 general elections 
and remained in office for sixteen years. It realised an export-based industrial 
manufacturing agenda. The social structure was affected. The mass of local 
industrial bourgeois was never enough and when state-assistance (wage freeze and 
protectionist policies) stopped, they went back to traditional merchant capital and 
real estate (Vella, 1994). Industrial workers employed by private capital, not colonial 
administration, were a novel sector represented politically by the governing MLP and 
its ally, the General Workers Union. Forced to be “functional substitute” to a weak 
bourgeoisie (Vella, 1989, p.194), government provided political leadership (populist 
and, with the Nationalist Party, henceforth PN, dispelling structural tensions in the 
parliamentary arena); economic entrepreneurialism (welfare, investment incentive 
schemes, vocational training, etc.); and cultural innovation (secularisation, State-
Church separation, etc.). The petty bourgeoisie was less homogenous. The number 
of traditional, small-scale producers, traders and small-holding farmers decreased; 
the new recruits, increasingly university-trained, of engineers and technicians, 
accountants and managers, or state administrators, blossomed.  
Academics, unless directly disturbed, appeared unperturbed. Amongst others, 
there was an “apparent inability or unwillingness (or both) of Maltese sociology 
to consider Malta’s economic development in a balanced way” and, Vella added, 
specifying industry, it was “a clear indication that sociologists are hardly free from 
the influence of hegemonic pressures in society” (2012, p.243). Other intellectuals 
remained aloof, not feeling the need for cultural contact with the ‘simple’ (Liguori, 
2015, p.105), except to reify traditional tools, legends, etc. Some did not escape 
change. Rev. Peter Serracino Inglott (henceforth PSI) ousted the scholastics as he 
reorganised the philosophy department at the University of Malta (henceforth 
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UOM), only for the Faculty of Arts and that of Theology to be suppressed from 
campus in 1978, not fitting in the major UOM reform by the MLP government to rid 
the campus from pre-industrial professions – notaries and lawyers, doctors, priests 
and teachers. The Theology case confirmed the need to secularise public space; 
eventually, under a post-1987 Demo-Christian PN government, it was important 
enough to return to campus and to give the Church privileged approval of full-time 
staff appointments by the UOM’s Philosophy Department. Whilst the MLP Reform 
aligned structure (industry) and superstructures (social reproduction), for PSI, the 
‘contemplative’ scholastics were ill-prepared for new dynamics. He intended to 
break the detachment from society of “Catholic spirituality and praxis” (Montebello, 
2009, p.109). Public space, not least in the ever-growing social media where culture 
industries were becoming popular, socio-political tools aiming to shape social 
consciousness, had to be re-occupied. Foremost in media expertise, Rev. Joe Borg’s 
page on the UOM website illustrates his presence and practice. PSI’s agenda was still 
on at the turn of the century; Anthony Spiteri proposed a transcendence discourse 
within “incarnational and praxical coordinates” intent on socio-political action 
(1997, pp.121-2).
This makes the role of PSI, given obvious differences, arguably close to that 
of Croce as discussed above. Both were popular across social class boundaries, 
attracting Left followership. Both innovated as they faced traditional intellectuals. 
Croce, who was minister for Public Education in Giolitti’s government, developed a 
conservative Liberal philosophy of practice (Q15:62); PSI supported the ‘liberalising’ 
conservative PN amongst others as policy-maker, as the prime minister’s private 
consultant, and in the 1988 Education Act (which received heavy criticism for 
content and gestation by the Liberal philosopher Wain in The Maltese national 
curriculum: A critical evaluation, 1991). J. Friggieri, provided a seamless continuity 
in succeeding PSI as head of the Philosophy department and was also a PN MEP 
election candidate. Similar to Croce (the Italian from outside university circles), PSI 
introduced a relatively more liberal, non-dogmatic language and non-provincial 
morality in philosophy (Montebello, 2009, p.109) and wanted philosophy to tackle 
political and scientific issues. And yet, Montebello adds, his texts were unhistorical 
and severed links between philosophy and the social context or else confirmed a 
conception of the world based on the age-old reason-and-faith balance. As in the 
case of Croce, one needed to discover what was left out. PSI was unable or unwilling 
to appraise real problems historically or politically, reducing them to “exclusively 
linguistic (or artistic) problems”, argued Vella (1989, p.177). This “dialectic of 
conservation and innovation” (Q8:27), understood here as “the critical search for 
what is equal in the apparent diversity, and distinct and even opposite in the apparent 
uniformity” (Q13:36), draws PSI to the same ‘cultural innovation’ boat as MLP Prime 
Minister Mintoff. The odd coupling is focal. Within their organisations there was 
a recognition of deep-cutting crises as the Church struggled against secularisation 
and the MLP faced late peripheral industrialisation. This uncovered contradictions 
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that determined immediate efforts by groups and personalities bent on conserving 
the relevance of their organisation, showing the structure is correctible and their 
role defensible. In their different fields, PSI’s popular status amongst philosophers 
and Mintoff’s high reputation amongst politicians appears to indicate ‘success’. As 
with PSI’s innovation and conservation, Mintoff’s praxis, with an “explicit distrust 
of ‘theoretical’ discourse and of ‘intellectuals’ generally” (Vella, 1989, p.190), 
increased popular participation in politics but participants remained supporters, 
exhibiting “doses of the traditional adaptations to powerlessness for many years to 
come” (Zammit, 1984, p.130), while his concentration of power increased. 
Conclusions
The Marxist tradition was absent in Malta in political practice (excluding the activities 
of a restricted group), and a combative movement that could realise a progressive 
philosophy was identifiable instead in the anti-colonial stream represented by 
the Dockyard workforce. The Liberal fear of the destructive moment (see Croce 
above) was exploited and transformed into a counter-praxis against this politicised 
movement. Mintoff on his part managed to ensure its integration within his political 
agenda by tackling the GWU pragmatically. He was assisted by the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of GWU members were MLP supporters.
Marxism was almost absent in theoretical practice; it could always guide research 
towards meaningful and comprehensive observations. Gramsci’s conceptual 
armature qualifies it further. Thus, passive revolution’s dialectic of conservation and 
innovation was identified in the praxis of PSI and Mintoff. The former’s intellectual 
practice of philosophy performing as a renovated conception of the world, worked 
for the PN’s building of class alliances with the new petty bourgeoisie (and associated 
expectations). PSI provided valuable assistance to Church and Party. Gramsci’s 
critical descriptions of how historic blocs of intellectuals and social classes/sectors 
are created is valuable in this case. PSI’s contribution worked against the MLP already 
suffering the backlash of its historically necessary political and cultural protagonism 
promoting its economic agenda.
Gramsci’s redefinition of Marx’s superstructure(s) as the consciousness-
forming political and ideological context outside the exclusive determination of 
the economic structure gave resonance to civil society’s concrete and established 
hegemonic apparatuses of Church, political parties, schools, trade unions, etc. PSI’s 
contribution to state responsibilities confirms the extended state concept combining 
formal political institutions with select civil society hegemonic forces illustrating 
the ‘full weight’ of the cultural factor. Instead of becoming an opportunity for 
subaltern ethico-political emancipation subverting traditional dominant relations, 
civil society was the terrain that made the transition to socialism, promised by the 
MLP, complicated, and it hardly left the ideological field. It indicated the dominant 
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‘history’ of the time, i.e., what the ruling political group attempts to impose as 
reality. This is how history and philosophy become indivisible and form a ‘bloc’ (Q10/
II:17). Paradoxically, the world projected by strong economic groups supporting the 
PN would, arguably, be more of a game-changer of conceptions promoted by the 
conservative stream than by the MLP’s socialism.
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